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B
ank failures are the most obvious manifestation of an unsafe and unsound
banking system. From the early 1980s through the early 1990s, approximately
10 percent of U.S. commercial banks failed, resounding evidence that the bank-
ing system was at the time neither safe nor sound. As Figure 1 shows, the bank failure
wave was an abrupt and substantial departure from normal conditions. The forty years
leading up to the banking recession were nearly failure-free: only 237 banks failed
between 1940 and 1980, an annual rate of fewer than four insolvencies per 10,000
banks. But the appearance of safety and soundness during those years is deceptive
because the financial regulations and industry structure present at the time were them-
selves the root cause of the bank insolvencies of the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, the obser-
vation that the banking industry has been nearly failure-free since the mid-1990s is not,
by itself, a good indication of the safety and soundness of today’s banking system.
George Benston, Robert Eisenbeis, Paul Horvitz, Edward Kane, and George
Kaufman wrote Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking: Past, Present, and
Future in 1986 near the peak of the bank failure wave. The book offered forward-
looking advice for increasing banking industry safety and soundness. Much of the
authors’ advice is now embedded in U.S. banking law and prudential regulatory poli-
cies, and there is consensus among industry analysts and commentators that these
regulatory changes have contributed importantly to a safer and sounder U.S. banking
system. But neither time nor technology stands still. Evolution and innovation in
financial markets, risk management techniques, information flows, and permissible
banking powers have substantially altered the fabric of the banking industry during the
intervening twenty years. Collectively, these regulatory and nonregulatory changes
have dampened some types of risk, amplified other types of risk, and created some
new types of risk. On balance, the banking system appears to be safer and sounder
today than two decades ago, but it faces new risk challenges that could not have been
anticipated in the 1980s.
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This paper outlines the fundamental changes in the structure of the U.S. com-
mercial banking industry over the past twenty years. I begin with a chronology of the
regulatory, technological, financial, and competitive changes leading up to, during,
and since the writing of Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking. Next, a strategic
analysis of the current state of the industry focuses on the concept of “transactions
banking” and compares the transactions banking business model (and the large finan-
cial companies that practice this relatively new approach to banking) to the more tra-
ditional relationship-based banking business model. Special attention is paid to the
different production technologies, product mixes, strategic behaviors, and risk-return
trade-offs that characterize these two diametrically opposed approaches to commer-
cial banking. The paper closes with a discussion of what these new developments may
mean for the ongoing safety and soundness of the banking industry.
The Evolution of the U.S. Banking Industry
1
During the 1970s, and indeed during all of the postwar period leading up to the 1970s,
U.S. commercial banking was a protected industry. Government regulations shielded
banks from geographic competition, from product competition, and to a great extent
from price competition. The McFadden Act of 1927 protected banks from outside
competition by prohibiting interstate branch banking. Although the act permitted
cross-border banking through multibank holding companies, these organizational
structures required state approval, and during the 1970s none of the states approved.
In addition to these interstate restrictions, most states imposed partial or blanket
restrictions on intrastate branching. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 effectively isolated
commercial banking as a separate and highly regulated financial sector and thus insu-
lated banks from competition with investment banks, insurance companies, and bro-
kerage firms. Moreover, depository institutions such as savings and loans and credit
unions were not permitted to compete with banks for commercial loans. Regulation Q
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tively prohibiting price competition between banks for deposit accounts.
By 1980 there were still 14,434 chartered commercial banks in the United States.
More than 97 percent of these commercial banks were “community banks” with less
than $1 billion (2001 dollars) of assets, and these small banks accounted for about
one-third of the industry’s total assets. The banking industry was the largest category
of financial intermediary in the United States, with more than 35 percent of the
nation’s intermediated assets (Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts). The indus-
try’s deposit franchise made it the dominant provider of transactions services
through checkable deposit accounts, and banks were an extremely important invest-
ment vehicle for consumers through savings accounts and time deposit accounts. For
example, consumers allocated approximately 23 percent of their assets to depository
institutions in 1983 (the first year that these data were available from the Federal
Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finance). An important feature of banks’ deposit fran-
chise was their access to the payment system, which at the time was predominantly
paper based. In a banking world that emphasized brick-and-mortar delivery, commu-
nity banks enjoyed a competitive advantage in their local markets because regulation
constrained brick-and-mortar entry by out-of-market banks, and automated teller
machines (ATMs) were still in their infancy. In states that limited branch banking,
this advantage was especially significant because large banks simply could not
branch into local markets.
Loan markets were generally segmented during the 1970s, and in some lending
markets banks (along with thrift institutions) were the dominant players. Banks and
thrifts dominated the residential mortgage market. Mortgage holdings by insurance
companies and finance companies were relatively small, and the mortgage securitiza-
tion market was limited mostly to Ginnie Mae passthroughs. With regard to consumer
loans, consumer finance companies tended to attract the higher-risk and subprime
borrowers, while banks, thrifts, and captive auto finance companies (for example,
GMAC, Ford Motor Credit) tended to attract the prime consumer borrower. Again,
because of the extensive limitations on branch banking, community banks’ power in
local markets afforded them a competitive advantage in consumer lending over larger
banks. Data from the Survey of Consumer Finance show that households obtained
approximately 60 percent of their mortgage and consumer debt from depository insti-
tutions in 1983.
Commercial lending in the 1970s was segmented across financial institutions and
within the banking industry. Large commercial banks made loans to business firms of
all sizes and were the major source of short-term financing to large businesses. Small
businesses are generally unable to get long-term financing other than to finance spe-
cific fixed assets such as equipment and real estate (see Carey et al. 1993). Community
banks, constrained by legal lending limits, focused on lending to smaller businesses.
Community banks allocated between 20 and 30 percent of their loan portfolio to com-
mercial loans, on average. Life insurance companies were also active in business
finance, but their activities were confined to longer-term financing to medium-sized
businesses and some large businesses.
Financial innovation and technological change. In the late 1960s and early
1970s money market interest rates regularly exceeded the Regulation Q ceiling on
deposit interest rates. This gap became huge after the Federal Reserve changed its
approach to monetary policy in 1979, with the ninety-day Treasury bill rate at one
43 ECONOMIC REVIEW First and Second Quarters 2007
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point exceeding the passbook savings account ceiling by more than 1,000 basis points.
As a result, deposits flowed out of low-yielding bank deposits and into higher-yielding
investments offered by nonbank institutions. The impact of this disintermediation was
felt most acutely by smaller banks and thrifts that depended on the small retail
deposits covered by Regulation Q, as opposed to large banks that relied more on large-
denomination CDs with interest rates that were set in competitive markets.
The threat from disintermediation was especially serious because retail customers
were gaining increased access to alternatives to bank deposits for their liquid invest-
ments. The most salient change was the introduction of money market mutual funds
(MMMFs) in 1971. Unlike existing large-denomination money market instruments such
as negotiable CDs and commercial paper, MMMFs came in denominations affordable to
households and small businesses; more-
over, MMMFs had a big competitive advan-
tage over Regulation Q–constrained bank
deposits because they paid higher money
market investment returns and allowed
consumers check-writing privileges. As a
result, MMMFs grew dramatically begin-
ning in the late 1970s. Later in the decade
Merrill Lynch took this innovation one step
further with its Cash Management Account by adding a third dimension, a brokerage
account. Innovations elsewhere in the financial services sector, such as universal life
insurance, which combined term life insurance with a money market–linked savings
component, created additional alternatives to retail bank deposits.
Other innovations had an equally powerful impact on retail banking. One of the
most important was the ATM, which reduced the cost of producing transactions ser-
vices and made them more convenient. Banks had initially hoped that the ATM would
be, as its name implies, a substitute for human tellers and perhaps even a partial sub-
stitute for bank branches. To the contrary, as the number of ATMs has increased, so
has the number of bank branches; these unexpected trends imply that bank delivery
systems have a variety of complex strategic characteristics, such as locations that
provide customer convenience, revenue centers that generate fee income (for example,
third-party ATM fees), and physical brick-and-mortar platforms for person-to-person
contact and relationship building. In addition to the ATM, other alternatives to brick-
and-mortar banking began to appear in the 1970s and 1980s. Although fully transac-
tional Internet banking did not appear until later, some banks began offering limited
forms of computer banking in the 1980s. Customers with a computer and modem could
pay bills and transfer money between accounts over telephone lines. Credit cards and
debit cards expanded rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s, and although they are not gen-
erally thought of this way, these payment vehicles represented yet another alternative
to the traditional bank delivery system.
Regulatory reaction to financial innovation and technological change.
During the 1980s it became increasingly difficult to maintain a regulatory environ-
ment that could protect the banking industry from product competition, interregional
competition, and interest rate competition while at the same time ensuring a vibrant
and healthy banking industry. Market conditions and financial and technological
innovation simply conspired against preservation of the old regime. Regulatory
change became inevitable and necessary.
In some ways this change came quickly. For example, a period of high interest rates
that began in 1979 led to the relatively rapid dismantling of Regulation Q, culminating
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among other things, allowed thrifts to make commercial loans and thus compete more
directly with community banks. The demise of the McFadden Act took longer. At the
intrastate level, thirty-two states liberalized their in-state geographic restrictions on
banking between 1980 and 1994. At the interstate level, states began to exploit the
multibank holding company loophole in the McFadden Act in the early 1980s, entering
into reciprocity agreements with each other that allowed cross-border bank ownership
through multibank holding companies. By the end of the decade, all but six states
allowed some sort of interstate banking, with most being part of large regional compacts.
Expansion of banking powers occurred at a somewhat more incremental and delib-
erate pace. On the retail side, the first major change came with the Garn–St. Germain
Act of 1982, which authorized banks and thrifts to offer money market deposit
accounts (MMDAs), transaction accounts with no interest rate ceiling, which allowed
them to compete directly with MMMFs. Until the end of the 1990s, most of the other
changes were facilitated by Federal Reserve Board rulings. The Federal Reserve was
given the authority under the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act and the 1970 amend-
ments to the act to determine what activities could be conducted by banking organi-
zations, subject to the condition that these activities be “closely related to banking.”
In 1987 the Federal Reserve allowed banks to form investment banking subsidiaries
(Section 20 subsidiaries), and in 1989 the Federal Reserve granted limited (percent
of bank income) corporate securities underwriting privileges to a select group of
banks. The percent-of-bank-income limitations were gradually relaxed during the
years that followed.
Some of the most fundamental changes in the banking industry over the past two
decades are a direct result of the growth of securitized lending. However, unlike the
deregulatory changes just discussed, in which government basically got out of the
way, securitization is a story about government intervention right from the beginning.
Securitization began in the 1960s with the creation of the Ginnie Mae passthrough
and exploded in the 1980s with the development of the collateralized mortgage obli-
gation. Two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac), are dominant forces in the residential mortgage market.
2 As of 2003 investors
held approximately $2 trillion in mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae
(about $1,300 billion) and Freddie Mac (about $770 billion), and Fannie and Freddie
held an additional $1.5 trillion of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities directly
in their own portfolios. Together, mortgages securitized by, or held in the portfolios
of, these two GSEs accounted for about 47 percent of total residential mortgage debt
in the United States (White 2003).
Securitization combined financial innovation with technological innovation. The
financial innovation is the synthetic creation of a liquid, traded security from a pool
of illiquid, nontraded assets (for example, individual residential mortgages and credit
card receivables) where often the payoff characteristics of the traded securities are
altered significantly from those of the underlying assets. For example, securitization
has become an important tool for community banks to geographically diversify their
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2. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac receive an implicit government subsidy because investors treat their
debt as if it were backed by a guarantee of the U.S. government. The competitive advantage
embodied in this subsidy, and the incentives that it creates for Fannie and Freddie, is the subject of
substantial public policy debate (for example, Hendershott and Shilling 1989; ICF 1990; Cotterman
and Pearce 1996; Passmore, Sparks, and Ingpen 2001; White 2003). 
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otherwise locally concentrated loan portfolios. The technological innovation is the
efficient compilation, computation, and dissemination of information related to the
performance and operation of the asset pools. One of the key links in this informa-
tion chain is credit-scoring technology, which transforms quantitative information
about individual borrowers (such as income, employment, or payment history) into
a single numerical credit score, which lenders can use when screening and approv-
ing loan applications, securitizers can use to group loans of similar risk into pools,
and investors can use (together with other
information) to evaluate the risk of the
resulting asset-backed securities.
First introduced in the 1950s, credit
scoring has become widely used in con-
sumer, mortgage, and micro-small business
lending over the past thirty years (Mester
1997). Although some (mostly larger) banks
have developed their own credit-scoring formulas, most lenders rely on third-party
credit bureau scores to solicit and prescreen applicants. Bureau scores are based
solely on the credit history of individuals as reflected in credit bureau reports, as
opposed to application scores that weigh other factors (for example, income and
employment) in addition to credit bureau information (Avery et al. 1999). Research
on credit scoring is still relatively new, so it remains difficult to quantify the economic
impact of credit scoring on the consumer, real estate, and small business lending
markets. For example, it is still an open question as to whether risk is assessed more
accurately using automated credit-scoring approaches or the more traditional, case-by-
case credit analysis performed by loan officers.
3 It does seem safe to assert, however,
that credit scoring has significantly reduced the unit cost of underwriting an individ-
ual loan, and as a result it has (a) increased the minimum efficient scale of consumer
loan underwriting operations and in the process (b) expanded lenders’ incentives
to make credit available (Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005; Frame, Srinivasan, and
Woosley 2001; DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro 2006).
Comprehensive deregulation, consolidation, and widespread technology
adoption. Banking industry deregulation reached its zenith during the 1990s. In 1994
Congress rationalized the patchwork of state-by-state geographic rules by passing the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which effectively repealed
the McFadden Act at the national level. The immediate response was the highest-ever
five-year run of bank mergers in U.S. history in terms of both the number and the value
of the banks acquired (Berger, Buch et al. 2004). Although the most prominent mergers
and acquisitions are the “megamergers” that combine two large banking companies, the
vast majority of U.S. bank mergers since (as well as before) Riegle-Neal have involved at
least one community bank (DeYoung and Hunter 2003). In 1999 Congress, its hand
forced by the announced merger of CitiBank (the largest U.S. bank) and Travelers (one
of the largest U.S. insurance companies), passed the Graham-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act.
GLB effectively repealed the Glass-Steagall Act and granted broad-based securities and
insurance powers to commercial banking companies.
These congressional acts ratified the decades-long deregulation movement, and
as such they marked the culmination of story lines that began in the 1970s and 1980s.
By removing long-standing limitations on bank size and bank product mix, these acts
helped accelerate the adoption of new financial processes and information technolo-
gies by U.S. banks. In general, larger banks have been quicker to adopt new technology
than have smaller banks, including electronic payments technologies, transactional
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works (Hannan and McDowell 1984), loan securitization, and various off-balance-
sheet activities (Berger and Udell 1993). However, the more scalable among these
technologies disseminated quite rapidly to smaller banks because of the existence of
a highly competitive sector of third-party technology vendors and declining costs of
delivering these technologies.
4
In the 1990s credit scoring was adopted by many large banks for micro-small
business lending. The definition for this class of lending varies across banks, but the
ceiling loan size generally lies between $100,000 and $250,000. Some banks use their
own proprietary models, and others have purchased credit-scoring models from outside
venders. In general these models rely on information about the entrepreneur (for
example, credit bureau reports) and mercantile credit information from third-party
information exchanges (for example, Dun and Bradstreet) as well as firm-specific
information. Recent research indicates that this technology has been associated with
an increase in overall small business lending and that it has enabled banks to make
loans to a more marginal class of loan applicants (Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley
2001; Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005; DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro 2006).
Financial technology has also had a significant effect on how banks manage risk.
After the run-up in interest rates in the 1970s caught many banks with an asset-liability
mismatch, the banking industry began to adopt interest rate risk management tech-
niques (for example, GAP-based programs and duration-based programs) to measure
their interest rate exposure. Advances in financial engineering and the development of
new and wider derivatives markets have improved banks’ ability to implement interest
rate risk management strategies. Following some highly visible financial fiascos, includ-
ing Barings PLC, Orange County, and Metallgesellshaft, banks began to implement mar-
ket risk management tools to measure and manage their trading risk in the mid-1990s.
In the latter half of the 1990s, banks began to adopt similar value at risk–based tools for
managing credit risk. The proposed new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) goes one step
further, using these new credit tools to link capital requirements to credit risk.
Possibly the biggest impact of technology on the banking system has been on the
payment system, where electronic payments technologies and fund transfers are
replacing paper-based payments (cash and checks) and paper record keeping. Gerdes
and Walton (2002) found a 3 percent per year decline in the number of checks paid
in the United States during the late 1990s, while payments made with credit cards
and debit cards were increasing by 7.3 percent and 35.6 percent per year, respec-
tively. These figures imply that checks’ market share of total payments declined from
80.8 percent to 64.6 percent. Similarly, Humphrey (2002) estimated that checks’
market share of total payments fell from 87.8 percent to 72.3 percent during the
1990s, although he found that overall check use was still rising modestly.
The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003 (Check 21) permitted banks
to improve the efficiency of check payments. By removing the requirement that banks
return physical paper checks from the banks where the checks are deposited to the
banks that pay them, Check 21 allowed banks to exploit improvements in information
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3. Only one published study has analyzed whether human intervention can improve decision making
on applicants rejected on the basis of credit scoring. This study used data from one bank with a
historically high “override” rate and found that overrides of applicants who would have been
rejected on the basis of the credit score did no better on average than their credit score alone pre-
dicted (Mayes 2003, chap. 12).
4. Frame and White (2004) survey the literature on technology adoption in the banking industry.
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technology. Instead, banks could simply transmit electronic check images, saving sub-
stantial transportation and handling expenses and potentially easing the competitive
disadvantages of check transactions relative to credit and debit card transactions.
The technology-driven switch from paper-based payments to electronic-based
payments is reflected in the steep increase in automated clearinghouse (ACH) trans-
actions, such as monthly mortgage payments and direct payroll deposits. ACH
volume handled by the Federal Reserve
increased at a 14.2 percent annual rate
from 1990 to 2000, and this pace has
resulted in an 83 percent reduction in
the costs of producing these transactions
from $0.959 to $0.158 in real 1994 dollars
(Berger 2003). Technology-driven cost
reductions in the processing of checks and cash payments have been more mod-
est (Bauer and Ferrier 1996; Bohn, Hancock, and Bauer 2001; Gilbert, Wheelock,
and Wilson 2002).
More recently, Internet banking has changed the landscape of the financial services
industry by reducing both the importance of geography and the cost of transactions.
In its most extreme form, a relatively small number of banks offer their services
exclusively on the Internet. As of July 2002 there were just twenty such Internet-only
operations; approximately another dozen Internet-only institutions have failed, been
acquired, or voluntarily liquidated; and in addition, several large banks have integrated
their Internet-only units into the main bank after poor stand-alone performance.
5 The
more widespread Internet banking approach is the “click-and-mortar” model that
combines a transactional Internet site with traditional brick-and-mortar offices or
ATM networks.
A substantial majority of banks have at least an informational Web site, and close
to a majority—and virtually all large banks—now offer transactional Internet sites
(Furst, Lang, and Nolle 2001, 2002; Sullivan 2001; Berger 2003). Because the basic
Internet banking transaction has low variable costs, there are economies of scale
associated with this production process and distribution channel (DeYoung 2005).
However, this does not preclude small banks from offering this technology, because
they can outsource both the development and the maintenance of their Internet sites
to website vendors. There is some evidence that offering Internet banking services
enhances the profitability of small banks (DeYoung, Lang, and Nolle, forthcoming).
Overall, the increased efficiency that results from a shift from paper-based to
electronic payments should reduce the amount of transactions balances required by
consumers. Indeed, consumers have reduced the fraction of their financial assets allo-
cated to transactions accounts by a third, from 7.3 percent in 1983 to 4.6 percent in 2001
(Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finance). Moreover, the increased efficiency that
results from a shift from full-service head offices to more specialized delivery channels
(branches, ATMs, Web sites) should reduce the number of inputs that banks require to
produce a given amount of banking services. The number of offices (bank branches
plus the head office) per bank has nearly quadrupled since 1970, while assets per office,
deposits per office, and transactions per office have steadily increased, and the number
of full-time employees per office has declined (DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell 2004).
A Stylized View of Banking Strategies
The previous section described myriad ways that deregulation, technological change,
and financial innovations have changed the competitive environment for commercial
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these phenomena using just four basic parameters: bank size, unit costs, lending
technologies, and product differentiation. This approach is derived from a series of
studies by DeYoung (2000), DeYoung and Hunter (2003), and DeYoung, Hunter, and
Udell (2004) and is illustrated here by the strategic maps in Figures 2 and 3.
The vertical dimension in these maps measures bank size, with large banks at the
bottom and small banks at the top. Because the production of banking services tends
to exhibit scale economies, the vertical dimension also measures unit costs, with low
unit costs at the bottom and high unit costs at the top. Research on bank scale
economies has evolved over the years, and the literature contains a fair number of
inconsistencies; however, some important points of agreement have emerged over
time. One point of general agreement is that small banks using a traditional banking
model (that is, intermediating transactions deposits into loans held on portfolio) can
gain substantial reductions in their unit costs—but not fully exploit all available scale
economies—while still remaining relatively small. Of course, as banks continue to
grow larger, they will gain access to additional reductions in unit costs, albeit at a
declining rate. But at some point bank size is constrained unless the bank changes
the manner in which it produces credit products and other financial services. For
example, Rossi (1998) shows that unit cost reductions at financial institutions doing
less traditional banking (for example, high-volume origination and securitization of
mortgage loans or credit card loans) continue to be substantial even at very large
scale, and this technological reality likely precludes small banks using traditional
lending approaches from successfully competing head to head with very large banks
in the production of financial commodity products.
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5. These figures are based on internal records compiled by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council.
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The horizontal dimension in Figures 2 and 3 measures the degree to which banks
differentiate their products and services from those of their closest competitors. Banks
that offer differentiated products and services (such as customized loan contracts or
personalized private banking) are located on the right, and banks that offer nondiffer-
entiated products and services (such as standardized mortgage loans or discount
online brokerage) are located on the left. Note that not all product differentiation is
tangible—it can often be a perception in the mind of the customer. For example, com-
munity banks attempt differentiation by knowing the names of their customers upon
sight, while large banks attempt to differentiate via marketing campaigns to create
brand images for otherwise undifferentiated products. If successfully deployed, both of
these strategies can support higher prices for retail banking services.
The horizontal dimension of standardization versus customization is also consis-
tent with the distinction between hard and soft information (Stein 2002; Berger,
Miller et al. 2005; Scott 2004). Banks on the left side of this information spectrum use
automated lending technologies to originate and securitize standardized mortgage or
credit card loans and to deliver credit-scored micro-business loans. Moving to the
right, banks emphasize more traditional lending technologies such as asset-based
lending and financial statement lending. Finally, at the far right, banks specialize in
relationship lending where loan officers acquire soft information about the borrower
over time via financial interactions with the borrower and through interaction with
the local community.
Pre-deregulation. Figure 2 illustrates the commercial banking industry prior to
the deregulation, technological advance, and financial innovation of the 1980s and
1990s. The positions of the circles indicate the business strategies selected by banks,
and the relative size of the circles indicates the relative size of the banks. All banks
were clustered near the northeast corner of the strategy space. Geographic regula-
tion restricted the size of banks and prevented most (and perhaps all) of them from
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and delivering banking services required interpersonal contact between loan officers
and borrowers to collect soft information, paper-based transactions for payments,
and visits to the bank to receive cash and deposit checks—all of which required
brick-and-mortar bank and branch locations staffed by bank employees. The level of
price competition on the deposit side was restricted on the one hand by Regulation Q
and on the other hand by the lack of substitute liquidity and transactions providers.
Retail competition, to the extent that it existed, was nonprice competition (for example,
person-to-person service, the convenience of having a branch nearby, and of course free
toasters for opening accounts). The price competition that is a hallmark of commodity-
based financial services was largely absent. And banks faced relatively little compe-
tition from nonbanks or securities markets for supplying credit to businesses.
Before deregulation, banks that specialized in retail banking, small business bank-
ing, and corporate banking shared many of the same characteristics, regardless of
their size. Small banks tended to offer a somewhat higher degree of person-to-person
interaction with retail customers, and large commercial accounts by necessity went
to large banks, but small banks and large banks had more commonalities with than
differences from each other. For the most part, there was a single retail banking strat-
egy (with some variants) and very little strategic difference among most banks’
approaches to commercial lending.
Post-deregulation. Deregulation, technological advance, and financial innova-
tion created new strategic opportunities for banks, and, as competition heated up,
banks had incentives to pursue those opportunities. As discussed above, the average
size of commercial banks began to increase—at first because of modest within-market
mergers and then more rapidly because of extension megamergers—and the disparity
in bank size within the industry also increased.
6 Although increased size yielded scale
economies for banks of all sizes, the largest banks gained access to the lowest unit
cost structures.
Large banks also became less like traditional banks because the size of their
operations allowed them to more efficiently apply the new production technologies
for which the “hardening” of information is crucial (for example, automated under-
writing, securitization, widespread ATM networks, electronic payments). This shift
had two effects. First, it reduced large banks’ unit costs even further. Second, it
changed their retail banking strategy to a high-volume, low-cost, “financial commod-
ity” strategy. Home mortgages, credit cards, and online brokerage are three examples
of financial services that have become dominated by large and very large financial
institutions, which use hard information and automated production and distribution
processes to deliver these services at low unit costs. Because price competition is
strong for nondifferentiated products, pricing pressure keeps margins low despite
these banks’ low unit costs. High volumes, constant vigilance to keep expenses in
line, and continuous innovation are essential for this strategy to earn satisfactory
returns for shareholders.
The incentives created by industry deregulation (which increased the potential
size and scope of commercial banks) and innovations in information technology and
financial markets (which gave large banks access to an entirely new business model)
drove a strategic wedge between the large and growing banks on the one hand and
the smaller community banks on the other hand. The result is shown in Figure 3. Large
banks have moved in a southwest direction on the map, sacrificing personalized service
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for large scale and gaining low unit costs by shifting to automated production tech-
niques. Although many community banks have also grown larger via mergers, they have
remained relatively small and have continued to occupy the same strategic ground. By
virtue of their small size, local economic focus, and person-to-person ethos, community
banks are well suited to gathering the soft information necessary to deliver highly dif-
ferentiated small business credit products and high-end consumer banking services.
This more traditional strategy has allowed well-managed community banks to charge
prices high enough to earn satisfactory rates of return despite their higher cost struc-
tures. In this view of the banking industry, community banks are differentiated from
large banks by their “high-value-added” strategy.
Four additional points complete the strategic analysis in Figures 2 and 3. First, the
corners of the strategy space represent the only potentially viable strategic choices for
banks; being “stuck in the middle” of such a map indicates the lack of a strategy and
leads to mediocre financial performance (Porter 1980). Second, the northwest corner
of the strategy space (high cost, low-value-added) is not a viable strategy for obvious
reasons. Third, the southeast corner of the strategy space (low cost, high-value-added)
is the most preferred location, but it is unlikely to be a viable long-run strategy. Without
some kind of entry barrier (such as patents or monopoly rights), the excess profits gen-
erated at this location will invite entry and the resulting competition will compress
margins back to a normal rate of return. Strategy-specific barriers also stand in the way.
Large banks may attempt to differentiate their products and services from those of
their competitors by creating brand images and other perceived differences, but offer-
ing true person-to-person service (as well as other high-value-added retail and small
business services) is difficult to achieve at a large scale. Small banks may attempt to
achieve lower unit costs via growth, but they run the risk of getting stuck in the mid-
dle because of the strategic dissonance between large size and personal service.
Nonetheless, the mere existence of this strategic ground, and the excess profits that
banks can earn in the short run or moderate run by occupying it, creates an incentive
for both large and small banks to innovate. Banks that do not strive via innovation to
reach this strategic ground are likely to leave the industry in the long run.
Finally, the dichotomy illustrated in Figure 3 obviously oversimplifies the array of
strategic choices available to commercial banks. For example, some large banks offer
customized services to certain sets of clients with idiosyncratic financial needs, such
as corporate investment banking clients and high-net-worth “private banking” cus-
tomers. Furthermore, some small Internet-only banks specialize in providing extremely
standardized retail banking services (DeYoung 2005). But the simplifications in this
framework allow us to isolate the main characteristics of community banks (small size,
local focus, and more traditional banking technology) and large banks (large size,
broad appeal, and highly automated banking technology) and in turn to realize that
community bank strategies and large bank strategies rely on different profit drivers.
DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004) argue that both small banks and large banks have
access to financially viable business models; in particular, they argue that financial
success for community banks in competitive local markets depends chiefly on (a) being
large enough to capture some modicum of scale economies and (b) bank managers’
ability to effectively implement the business model.
Evidence Consistent with the Strategic Map
There is considerable empirical evidence consistent with the strategic dichotomy
illustrated in Figure 3, some of which is displayed in Table 1. These data are mean
values of various financial ratios for different-sized groups of U.S. commercial
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over the 2000–05 period, yields results qualitatively similar to those displayed in
the table.) To be included in the analysis banks had to meet the following criteria:
They held a state or federal commercial bank charter, were located in one of the
fifty states or the District of Columbia, were at least ten full years old,
7 and had rea-
sonably traditional bank balance sheets that included loans, transactions deposits,
and insured deposits; monoline banks and other special-purpose banks were
excluded. Banks were also excluded if they did not fall into one of the five asset-
size classes represented in Table 1: large banks, with more than $10 billion in assets;
community banks with either less than $100 million in assets, $100 million to $500 mil-
lion in assets, or $500 million to $2 billion in assets; or rural community banks, with
less than $2 billion in assets. Rural banks are included as a separate category because
of their special role in providing agricultural credit and because they tend to face
less competition in the rural towns in which they are located; however, rural banks
use a business model very similar to that of other community banks and for most
purposes can be considered to be community banks. Finally, the community banks
and the rural banks had to meet the following additional conditions: They were
domestically owned, derived at least half their deposits from branches located in a
single county, and were either freestanding firms, the sole bank in a one-bank holding
company, or an affiliate in a multibank holding company composed solely of other
community banks.
The five size classes in Table 1 correspond to the dichotomy suggested by the
strategic map analysis: Banks in the “large bank” group have more than $10 billion of
assets, a size that far exceeds most definitions of a community bank. Banks in the
other four groups are clearly too small to be producing financial commodity products
as their main strategy. Comparing the financial ratios across the columns of Table 1
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Table 1
Mean Values for U.S. Commercial Banks in 2004
Large Medium Small Rural
community community community community
Large bank bank bank bank bank
Asset size > $10B $500M–$2B $100M–$500M < $100M < $2B
Headquarters location urban urban urban urban rural
Credit card loans/total loans 0.076 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003
Loans sold or securitized/total loans 0.262 0.031 0.017 0.006 0.010
Small business loans/total loans 0.044 0.089 0.115 0.143 0.128
Fed funds purchased/assets 0.086 0.039 0.020 0.009 0.011
Core deposits/total deposits 0.287 0.382 0.527 0.618 0.622
Net interest margin 0.032 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.038
Advertising expense/
total noninterest expense 0.027 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.015
Note: All banks are at least ten years old.
Source: FDIC data and author’s calculations
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offers further support for a “strategic wedge” between larger and smaller banks—but
it also suggests that in some dimensions, the size-based differences are more of a
continuum than a discrete difference.
The data for credit card loans, loan sales and securitizations, and small business
loans offer clear evidence of a strategic wedge between large and small banks. On aver-
age, about 8 percent of loans at the large banks were credit card loans—a classic finan-
cial commodity product—compared to less than half of 1 percent for the smaller banks.
The production of credit card loans (even after excluding monoline credit card banks)
has clearly gravitated toward large banks because of the scale economies present in this
business line. Credit card receivables are often securitized, and, consistent with this fact,
the average large bank securitized about 26 percent of its loans during 2004. This rate
compares to a mere 3 percent or less at the small banks. This finding indicates that most
of the loans made by small banks are either nonstandardized (for example, business
loans, commercial real estate loans) and hence cannot be securitized or are part of a
multiple-product bank-borrower relationship that is enhanced by holding the credits on
the balance sheet (for example, deposit accounts plus loan accounts). Small business
loans are the other side of this lending coin: The small business loan is the classic rela-
tionship loan, underwritten based on soft information. On average, the large banks had
only 4 percent of their loan portfolio invested in small business loans versus between
9 percent and 14 percent for the smaller banks. (Note that this comparison likely under-
states the small-business lending gap between large and small banks: Some large banks
make “micro-small business loans” that are underwritten based on the personal credit
score of the proprietor and hence can be more like credit card loans than relationship
loans based on soft information.)
The comparative data for fed funds purchased and core deposits are also consis-
tent with the two theorized approaches to banking. On average, the large banks funded
more than 8 percent of their assets with funds purchased overnight from other banks
compared to between 1 percent and 4 percent for the smaller banks. Similarly, only
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Table 2
Mean Values for Large U.S. Commercial Banks in 2004
Large
Large bank community bank
Asset size > $10B $500M–$2B
Headquarters location urban urban
Noninterest income/
total operating income 0.394 0.219
Fee income on deposits/
total noninterest income 0.279 0.418
Composition of noninterest income
Investment banking 0.059 0.029




Note: All banks are at least ten years old.
Source: FDIC data and author’s calculations
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transactions deposits, savings deposits, and certificates of deposit less than $100,000)
compared to between 38 percent and 62 percent for the smaller banks. Both of these
findings illustrate the difference between the traditional banking approach, in which
long-term deposits are used to fund on-balance-sheet portfolios of nonstandardized
loans that reflect a variety of customer relationships, versus the transactional banking
approach, in which standardized loans are securitized and sold, funding is short run,
and deposit accounts are typically unrelated
to loan accounts. However, note that the
decline in core deposit funding as banks
get larger is a relatively gradual decline
rather than a discrete regime shift between
small and large banks. This pattern might
indicate that the rapid asset growth rates
of the largest community banks require a
less traditional funding mix (it is well known that core deposits cannot be grown as
fast as loan accounts), or it might indicate that the largest community banks are grow-
ing at the expense of their relationship-based business strategies and are risking getting
stuck in the middle of the strategic map.
The differences in net interest margin across the various-sized banks flow directly
from the comparative differences in funding and lending just noted. The average net
interest margin for the large banks was 3.2 percent compared to 3.6 percent to 3.9 per-
cent for the smaller banks. Securitizable loans are financial commodities sold in highly
competitive markets, and the competitive rivalry (a) puts downward pressure on loan
rates and (b) can create pressure to extend credit to risky borrowers that have high
probabilities of defaulting or missing payments. These phenomena depress interest
income per dollar at large banks relative to the interest rates that smaller banks can
charge for relationship-based loans made to informationally opaque borrowers in less
competitive markets. Fed funds and noncore deposits are more expensive sources of
funding and thus put upward pressure on deposit interest rates. This pressure increases
interest expenses per dollar at large banks relative to the interest rates paid by smaller
banks to their largely core depositors.
Finally, the intensity of advertising expenditures differs substantially by bank
size. On average, advertising expenditures account for only 1.3 percent to 2.0 per-
cent of noninterest expenses at the small banks compared to about 2.7 percent at the
large banks. This doubling of advertising intensity from the smallest banks to the
large banks is consistent with the strategic map analysis in several ways. First, most
large banks are still in the process of growing and entering new geographic markets,
and advertising support is essential for establishing presence in a new market.
Second, small banks can spend less on advertising because their strategy is locally
focused (so word of mouth is relatively more effective) and is based on multiproduct
relationships that keep the customer coming back to bank branches and Web sites
(where it is inexpensive to communicate with customers). The implications of these
advertising patterns will be discussed at greater length below.
Although large banks generate lower interest margins than small banks, they aug-
ment their interest income with noninterest income—often referred to generically as
“fee” income—to a greater extent than small banks. Table 2 shows that noninterest
income accounts for nearly 40 percent of operating income (net interest income plus
noninterest income) on average in the large bank group, roughly twice as much as the
average bank in the large community bank group (about 22 percent). This disparity is
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also consistent with the strategic dichotomy illustrated in Table 1. For example, secu-
ritized lending operations generate relatively little interest income because loans are
not retained, but they generate a disproportionate amount of noninterest income
through loan origination fees, loan securitization fees, and loan servicing fees. Also
note that the composition of noninterest income at large banks includes substantially
more fee income from investment banking and insurance activities than at smaller
banks; these nontraditional banking activities were made possible by deregulation,
and the fact that smaller banks have not taken greater advantage of these powers is
due in part to the scale of operations needed but is, more importantly, an indication of
their strategy that focuses on traditional banking activities.
Further Implications of Strategic Change
While the data offer clear support for the strategic map analysis in Figures 2 and 3, a
more complete appreciation of this strategic shift requires analysis outside of this sim-
ple and highly stylized framework. This section draws on existing research in bank-
ing and finance to more closely examine how the dichotomy of transactions banking
versus relationship banking has shaped competitive rivalry and financial performance
in the U.S. banking industry.
Industry structure. Geographic deregulation released a binding constraint on
the size of banking companies that wished to grow larger, and advances in financial and
information technologies provided a potentially attractive business model (transactions
banking) that could be exploited most profitably by large banks. The fastest way for
commercial banks to take advantage of these opportunities was to acquire other exist-
ing banks. On average, 500 commercial banks were acquired each year between 1990
and 2000 in an industry that started the decade with about 12,000 banks. These acqui-
sitions substantially altered the structure of the U.S. banking industry.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the wave of bank mergers and acquisitions had two
effects on the number and size distribution of U.S. banks. First, the number of banks
(measured by the number of bank charters) had declined by about half since 1980,
from around 14,000 banks—a number that had remained remarkably stable since the
1950s—to fewer than 8,000 banks today. Note that this large decline in banks is a net
figure and was not completely caused by mergers and acquisitions. On the one hand, the
2,000-plus bank failures displayed in Figure 1 account for a portion of this decline,
while on the other hand, more than 3,000 new banking charters were granted by state
and federal banking authorities during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Strong anecdotal
evidence, as well as systematic empirical evidence, indicates that these new, or “de
novo,” banks tended to start up in markets in which local established banks had been
acquired (Berger, Bonime et al. 2004; Keeton 2000).
Second, the size distribution of banks has clearly changed. The number of banks
with more than $1 billion in assets has remained between 300 and 450 since 1980,
and the number of banks with between $500 million and $1 billion in assets has
remained near 3,000 since 1980. Nearly all of the reduction in the number of banks
has occurred in the less-than-$500-million category, which has fallen from approxi-
mately 11,000 in 1980 to fewer than 5,000 today. Three phenomena account for most
of this huge decline: The vast majority of bank failures since 1980 occurred in this
size group; most of the banks acquired since 1980 were from this size group; and a
substantial number of banks grew out of this size group by acquiring other small
banks. (The stable populations in the two larger size groups indicate that the num-
ber of banks growing into higher size groups was roughly offset by the number of
banks disappearing from the industry as merger targets.)
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provide the most likely explanation for the death of so many small and medium-sized
community banks, while larger community banks continue to survive. The literature
on bank scale economies is large and has produced greatly different estimates of min-
imum efficient scale over the years.
8 The earliest studies concluded that scale
economies were fully exhausted by relatively small banks; most of these studies esti-
mated minimum efficient scale for banks to be less than $1 billion of assets (2001 dol-
lars). More recent studies have yielded somewhat different insights; many of these
studies conclude that scale economies are available for large regional and super-
regional banks. While part of the difference between these two sets of studies is the
inferior (though state-of-the-art at that time) methodologies used by the earlier stud-
ies, the more important difference is the change in production technologies over time
as banks have taken advantage of new information and financial technologies in the
production of banking services. The survival analysis in Figure 4 suggests that eco-
nomically meaningful scale savings can be captured by growing up to $500 million in
assets but that growing beyond $500 million—at least for community banks—yields
far less substantial gains.
Efficient scale is likely to be quite different for transactions banks and other
banks that do not use traditional banking business models. As noted above, Rossi
(1998) shows that even very large mortgage banks (which use a classic transactions
banking approach) face increasing returns to scale. Hughes et al. (1996) conclude
that even the largest commercial bank holding companies (in which product volume
is often dominated by transactions banking activities) also exhibit increasing returns
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Figure 4
Survivor Analysis: Number of Bank Charters for Banks in Different Asset Categories
Note: The data suggest that the strongest scale efficiencies are for banks with less than $500 million in assets.
Source: FDIC data and author’s calculations
DeYOUNG article  4/12/07  4:12 PM  Page 5758 ECONOMIC REVIEW First and Second Quarters 2007
to scale. And DeYoung (2005) argues that Internet-only banks (again, with a pure
transactions banking strategy) exhibit larger scale economies than similar-sized banks
that have branches. Acquiring other relatively large banks in other markets has been
the quickest way for large banks to capture the potentially huge scale economies
available from transactions banking models.
Geographic expansion by merger has eliminated thousands of banking charters
and has created very large banking companies—for example, just before the passage
of the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking Act in 1994, only four banks had more than
$100 billion in assets; a decade later ten banks were that large, with two of these banks
approaching $1 trillion in assets. This industrywide consolidation has had little effect
on the structure of local markets—by definition, geographic expansion mergers leave
local market shares unchanged—but the nature of the competitive rivalry in markets
can change. Studies have shown improved cost efficiency at small local banks follow-
ing market entry by large out-of-market banks, presumably because of competitive
pressure (DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchhoff 1998; Evanoff and Ors 2001). Other studies
have shown that outside entrants with stronger “brand images” are able to expand their
local market shares faster than average (Berger and Dick, forthcoming), consistent with
the idea that perceived differentiation can be an effective tool for large banks that sell
financial commodity products.
Geographic expansion mergers have also increased the distances within banking
organizations and may have created internal management problems. Berger and
DeYoung (2001, 2006) find that banking affiliates located farther away from the head-
quarters bank were less operationally efficient. While improvements in communications
and information technologies have proved helpful in reducing these long-distance
management problems, such organizational inefficiencies are one reason that small,
locally focused banks may continue to be financially viable in competition with large
banks. Distances between banks and their loan clientele have also increased over
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ing models allow banks to make consumer, mortgage, credit card, and even some small
business loans to borrowers they have never met in person, and asset securitization
and credit derivatives allow banks to manage the risk associated with this type of
lending (Petersen and Rajan 2002; DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro 2006).
It is important to understand that the reduction in banking companies over the past
two decades has not necessarily increased the distances between borrowers and lenders
because banks have simultaneously increased the size of their branching networks. There
are about 70,000 commercial bank branches
in the United States today compared to only
about 40,000 in 1990. This explosion in
bank branches has been largely strategic in
nature. For example, in some markets (such
as Chicago) large banking companies are
packing the map with branches in order to
establish market presence and to limit entry
by competitors. By increasing the size and scope of its branch network, a bank can posi-
tion itself closer to its current clients as well as its potential customers. This strategy can
be especially important for large, transactions banks; although it is difficult for these
banks to offer personalized banking services, they can offer high levels of customer con-
venience by locating close by. This higher level of convenience may explain why retail
customers appear willing to pay higher deposit-related fees at large banks. Finally, phys-
ical branches located in prominent places also serve as an important advertising vehicle,
especially in markets into which a bank has just expanded.
Noninterest income. After the dramatic consolidation of industry structure,
perhaps the next biggest change in the U.S. banking system in the past two decades
is the shift from interest income to noninterest income. As shown in Figure 5, the
percentage of total industry income derived from noninterest income doubled
between 1980 and 2000. (Note that this time period coincides almost exactly with the
large decline in the number of U.S. commercial banks shown in Figure 4.)
The increased importance of noninterest income at U.S. banks can be traced to
three primary sources. First, product market deregulation (that is, the expansion of
Section 20 securities subsidiaries during the 1990s, insurance powers granted to
national banks during the late 1990s by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999) granted banking companies the power to
produce or sell nontraditional banking services such as equity and debt underwriting,
securities brokerage, and insurance products. These lines of business generate pri-
marily fee income and negligible interest income. Second, some traditional banking
services that used to generate interest income for banks now generate fee income.
For example, while in the past banks might make a loan to a business client (interest
income), banks might now sell that client a backup line of credit (noninterest income)
that the client needs to issue its own commercial paper or other debt instrument.
Similarly, a large portion of retail lending by banks has shifted from portfolio lending
(interest income) to securitized lending (noninterest income). Third, the repeal of
Regulation Q, which allowed banks to pay market interest rates on deposits, had the
effect of increasing the prices charged for deposit services (teller services, check
charges, certified checks, bounced checks, etc.), which had traditionally been subsi-
dized by low deposit interest rates.
It is tempting to conclude that the increase in noninterest income shown in
Figure 5 means that loan-based and other intermediation activities have become a
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less important part of the value of the banking franchise. Figure 6 displays 1984–2001
time series of the annual cross-sectional correlations between commercial bank profits
(returns on equity [ROE]) and net interest margins, for both large (assets greater than
$1 billion) and small (assets less than $1 billion) banks (DeYoung and Rice 2004b). If
intermediation had become less important to banks over time, these time series should
arguably be declining over time, but this is obviously not the case.
The increase in noninterest income has altered the risk-return profiles of U.S.
banks. DeYoung and Roland (2001) argue that noninterest income may be riskier than
interest income, contradicting the early expectations of many industry analysts who
believed that fee income was more stable than interest income or that fee income had
positive diversification effects at banks. First, the fee income generated by some
financial services is likely to be more volatile than interest income from lending. For
example, compare fee income from the origination of mortgage loans that are quickly
sold off to interest income from a small business loan that is held in portfolio. The for-
mer is a nonrepeat business with revenues that are sensitive to volatility in the housing
market and mortgage interest rates, while the latter is based on a long-term relation-
ship that both sides wish to continue. Similarly, because fee income from brokerage
activities is typically a fixed portion of the value of assets under management, or a fixed
percentage of the value of the trades made, these revenues contain systematic (undi-
versifiable) risk that is generated by the business cycle. Second, many noninterest
activities have high fixed costs (personnel expenses), while lending has high variable
costs (interest expenses). This high fixed-to-variable cost ratio results in higher
operating leverage for the noninterest activities, which amplifies revenue volatility
into even greater earnings volatility.
Several empirical studies have investigated the riskiness of noninterest income at
U.S. commercial banks. DeYoung and Roland (2001) find that non-deposit-related fee
income is associated with both higher revenue volatility and higher earnings volatility.
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ciated with a worsening of banks’ risk-return trade-off. Stiroh (2004a, 2004b) finds no
evidence of diversification gains at banks that combine interest and noninterest income.
Choi, DeYoung, and Hasan (2007) study market returns at banks from forty-two different
countries and find that noninterest income exposes banks to increased systematic risk.
Financial performance. The two broad strategies illustrated in Figure 3—
transactions banking and relationship banking—are known as generic strategies
(Porter 1980). Within any generic strategy there can be many strategic variations hav-
ing similar though not identical characteristics. DeYoung and Rice (2004a) defined
eleven such strategic groups within the U.S. commercial banking industry, with the
objective of determining whether these different banking business models generated
similar or different financial returns.
Banks were assigned to one or more of these strategic groups based on the finan-
cial services in which they concentrated, the input mixes and production technologies
they used to generate those services, their growth strategies, and the customer seg-
ments that they targeted. Banks with less than $500 million in assets were excluded
because, as discussed above, these banks are likely operating below minimum effi-
cient banking scale. For the remaining banks, the mean ROE (a measure of expected
return) and standard deviation of ROE (a measure of risk) were calculated using data
from 1993 through 2003. Finally, the average risk and average return were calculated
across the banks in each strategic group.
The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 7, where the points on the graph
represent the risk-expected return combination for each of the eleven strategic groups.
The nontraditional group is closest to the stylized transactions banking model (large
size, substantial loan securitization activity, high noninterest income, low core deposit
funding), while the community bank group is closest to the stylized relationship bank-
ing model (small size, local focus, portfolio lending, low noninterest income, high core
deposit funding). The community banking model generates a very low expected return
and very low risk, while the nontraditional group generates relatively higher expected
return and relatively higher risk. In other words, transactions (nontraditional) banking
is riskier than relationship (community) banking, but the owners of transactions banks
receive higher expected returns in order to put up with this riskiness—that is, there is
a positive risk-expected return trade-off across banking strategies. The regression line
running through the eleven points represents the average risk-return tradeoff in the
industry, moving from strategic group to strategic group.
9
The high level of risk for the nontraditional strategic group and the low level of
risk for the community banking group are both consistent with the research findings
discussed in the prior section: Noninterest income is relatively volatile, while relation-
ship lending income is relatively stable. Similarly, the risk-return positions of the other
strategic groups make economic sense. The high expected returns for banks that
were growing quickly during the sample period (“growers” and “mergers”) reflect the
profitable investment opportunities that make firms grow quickly, and the high risk
for these banks reflects the transitory expenses associated with rapid growth (for
example, one-time merger-related charges, short-run excess capacity at newly estab-
lished branches). “Diversified” banks that produce a balanced set of different loan
and fee-based outputs operate with relatively low risk. “Private” banks that manage
the investment portfolios of their wealthy clientele have relatively high levels of risk,
reflecting the sensitivity of their fee income to systematic or market risk.
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“Traditional” banks that have not availed themselves of recent financial innova-
tions (such as those with no asset securitization or with a heavy dependence on inter-
est income) and banks with “no strategy” (those that did not fall into any of the other
ten strategic groups) both have poor risk-expected return trade-offs. The former
strategy implies the financial perils of nonprogressive, stagnant management, while
the lack of strategy illustrates the dangers of being stuck in the middle.
Is the Industry Safe and Sound Today?
Today’s commercial banking industry is clearly more diverse than the banking industry
in 1986, when Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking was written. Today’s largest
banks dwarf those of twenty years ago, while very small community banks still exist in
large numbers. Some banks practice strategies that rely almost completely on non-
interest income, while more traditional banks still exist that rely primarily on interest
income. Some banks have aggressive growth strategies that would have been unpracti-
cable during the geographically regulated industry of the 1980s. Some banks use asset
securitization and derivative securities to manage credit and interest rate risk, while
other banks continue to rely primarily on careful loan underwriting, monitoring, and
asset-liability management practices. Some banks create brand images with advertising
campaigns, while others continue to let word of mouth carry their reputations to local
customers. Most banks continue to count on core deposit funding, while many of the
largest banks purchase a large portion of their funds in financial markets.
Given this increased diversity, one would expect substantial variation in financial
performance across banking companies—and perhaps a greater chance that, at any
given time, at least some banking companies would be suffering financial distress. Is
the banking industry safer and sounder today than twenty years ago?
The answer is almost certainly yes, in no small part because of the public poli-
cies advocated twenty years ago by Professors Benston, Eisenbeis, Horvitz, Kane,
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banking policies. Not surprisingly, the manifestation of these policies can be seen in
the historically high capital levels held by today’s banks. Figure 8 shows the aggregate
equity-to-assets ratios for U.S. commercial banks (book values) each year during the
postwar period. Note the continuous improvement in the aggregate capital level that
started in the early 1990s, increasing from 6 percent then to 10 percent today. This
large reservoir of capital provides a substantial margin of safety and soundness
against the (perhaps) increased opportunities for risk taking in today’s deregulated
banking industry.
This large capital cushion is the result of three developments. First and foremost
is the stricter supervisory and regulatory framework mandated by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, the centerpiece of which is prompt
corrective action that imposes costly restrictions on banks with diminishing capital
levels. In addition, the increased competitive pressure facing banking companies—
predominantly a result of deregulation and financial innovation—requires banks to
operate efficiently or else exit the industry via acquisition. Efficient operations yield
higher earnings, and higher earnings generate increased capital via retained earn-
ings. And finally, fortunate macroeconomic circumstances over the past twenty
years, together with the elimination of so many regulatory constraints, have allowed
banks to achieve record earnings levels. Figure 8 illustrates how truly impressive
these increases in bank earnings are: Industry return on equity has remained at his-
torically high levels since the early 1990s despite the fact that industry equity levels
have nearly doubled.
One should not conclude from this performance that today’s banking industry is
invulnerable to a banking crisis—unfortunately, history likes to repeat itself. But
it is safe to conclude that the industry is safer and sounder now than it was twenty
years ago.
63 ECONOMIC REVIEW First and Second Quarters 2007












Return on equity (ROE)
Figure 8
Bank Capital and Earnings, 1934–2004
Source: FDIC and author's calculations
DeYOUNG article  4/12/07  4:12 PM  Page 6364 ECONOMIC REVIEW First and Second Quarters 2007
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 
Avery, Robert B., Raphael W. Bostic, Paul S. Calem,
and Glenn B. Canner. 1999. Credit scoring: Statistical
issues and evidence from credit bureau files. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Working
Paper, March.
Bauer, Paul W., and Gary D. Ferrier. 1996. Scale
economies, cost efficiencies, and technological change
in Federal Reserve payments processing. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 28, no. 4, pt. 2:1004–39.
Benston, George J., Robert A. Eisenbeis, Paul M.
Horvitz, Edward J. Kane, and George G. Kaufman.
1986. Perspectives on safe and sound banking: Past,
present, and future. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Berger, Allen N. 2003. The economic effects of tech-
nological progress: Evidence from the banking indus-
try. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35,
no. 2:141–76.
Berger, Allen N., Seth D. Bonime, Lawrence G. Goldberg,
and Lawrence J. White. 2004. The dynamics of market
entry: The effects of mergers and acquisitions on de
novo entry and small business lending in the banking
industry. Journal of Business 77, no. 4:797–834.
Berger, Allen N., Claudia M. Buch, Gayle DeLong, and
Robert DeYoung. 2004. Exporting financial institutions
management via foreign direct investment mergers
and acquisitions. Journal of International Money
and Finance 23, no. 3:333–66.
Berger, Allen N., and Robert DeYoung. 2001. The effects
of geographic expansion on bank efficiency. Journal of
Financial Services Research 19, nos. 2–3:163–84.
———. 2006. Technological progress and the geo-
graphic expansion of the banking industry. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 38, no. 6:1483–1513.
Berger, Allen N., and Astrid Dick. Forthcoming. Entry
into banking markets and the first-mover advantage.
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.
Berger, Allen N., W. Scott Frame, and Nathan H. Miller.
2005. Credit scoring and the availability, price, and risk
of small business credit. Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking 37, no. 2:191–222.
Berger, Allen N., Gerald A. Hanweck, and David B.
Humphrey. 1987. Competitive viability in banking:
Scale, scope, and product mix economies. Journal
of Monetary Economics 20, no. 3:501–20.
Berger, Allen N., and Loretta J. Mester. 1997. Inside
the black box: What explains differences in the effi-
ciencies of financial institutions? Journal of Banking
and Finance 21, no. 7:895–947.
Berger, Allen N., Nathan H. Miller, Mitchell A. Petersen,
Raghuram G. Rajan, and Jeremy C. Stein. 2005. Does
function follow organizational form? Evidence from the
lending practices of large and small banks. Journal of
Financial Economics 76, no. 2:237–69.
Berger, Allen N., and Gregory F. Udell. 1993. Securiti-
zation, risk, and the liquidity problem in banking. In
Structural change in banking, edited by Michael
Klausner and Lawrence J. White. Homewood, Ill.:
Business One Irwin.
Bohn, James, Diana Hancock, and Paul Bauer. 2001.
Estimates of scale and cost efficiency for Federal
Reserve currency operations. Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland Economic Review 37, no. 4:2–26.
Carey, Mark, Stephen Prowse, John Rea, and Gregory
Udell. 1993. The economics of private placements: A
new look. Financial Markets, Institutions, and
Instruments 2:1–66.
Choi, Sungho, Robert DeYoung, and Iftekhar Hasan.
2007. Risk, return, and non-interest income at com-
mercial banks: Cross-country evidence. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Working Paper.
Clark, Jeffrey A. 1988. Economies of scale and scope
at depository financial institutions: A review of the
literature. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Economic Review (September): 16–33.
———. 1996. Economic cost, scale efficiency, and com-
petitive viability in banking. Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking 28, no. 3, pt. 1:342–64.
Cotterman, Robert F., and James E. Pearce. 1996. The
effects of the Federal National Mortgage Association
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation on
conventional fixed-rate mortgage yields. In Studies
on privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development,
edited by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
DeYoung, Robert. 1999. Mergers and the changing land-
scape of commercial banking (part I). Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed Letter, no. 145. 
———. 2000. Mergers and the changing landscape of
commercial banking (part II). Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, Chicago Fed Letter, no. 150. 
———. 2005. The performance of Internet-based
business models: Evidence from the banking industry.
Journal of Business 78, no. 3:893–947.
REFERENCES
DeYOUNG article  4/12/07  4:12 PM  Page 6465 ECONOMIC REVIEW First and Second Quarters 2007
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 
DeYoung, Robert, Dennis Glennon, and Peter Nigro.
2006. Borrower-lender distance, credit scoring, and the
performance of small business loans. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation CFR Working Paper.
DeYoung, Robert, and Iftekhar Hasan. 1998. The per-
formance of de novo commercial banks: A profit effi-
ciency approach. Journal of Banking and Finance
22, no. 5:565–87.
DeYoung, Robert, Iftekhar Hasan, and Bruce Kirchhoff.
1998. The impact of out-of-state entry on the efficiency
of local commercial banks. Journal of Economics and
Business 50, no. 2:191–203.
DeYoung, Robert, and William C. Hunter. 2003. Deregu-
lation, the Internet, and the competitive viability of large
banks and community banks. In The future of banking,
edited by Benton Gup. Westport, Conn.: Quorom Books.
DeYoung, Robert, William C. Hunter, and Gregory F.
Udell. 2004. The past, present, and probable future for
community banks. Journal of Financial Services
Research 25, no. 2:85–133.
DeYoung, Robert, William W. Lang, and Daniel L. Nolle.
Forthcoming. How the Internet affects output and per-
formance at community banks. Journal of Banking
and Finance.
DeYoung, Robert, and Tara Rice. 2004a. How do banks
make money? A variety of business strategies. Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives 28,
no. 4:52–67.
———. 2004b. Noninterest income and financial per-
formance at U.S. commercial banks. Financial Review
39, no. 1:101–27.
DeYoung, Robert, and Karin P. Roland. 2001. Product
mix and earnings volatility at commercial banks:
Evidence from a degree of total leverage model.
Journal of Financial Intermediation 10, no. 1:54–84.
Evanoff, Douglas, and Philip Israilevich. Productive
Efficiency in Banking. 1991. Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Economic Perspectives (July): 11–32.
Evanoff, Douglas D., and Evren Ors. 2001. Local mar-
ket consolidation and bank productive efficiency.
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago manuscript.
Frame, W. Scott, Aruna Srinivasan, and Lynn Woosley.
2001. The effect of credit scoring on small business
lending. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 33,
no. 3:813–25.
Frame, W. Scott, and Lawrence J. White. 2004. Empirical
studies of financial innovation: Lots of talk, little action?
Journal of Economic Literature 42, no. 1:116–44.
Furst, Karen, William W. Lang, and Daniel E. Nolle. 2001.
Internet banking in the U.S.: Landscape, prospects,
industry implications. Journal of Financial Transfor-
mation 2 (August): 45–52.
———. 2002. Internet banking. Journal of Financial
Services Research 22, nos. 1–2:95–117.
Gerdes, Geoffrey R., and Jack K. Walton II. 2002. The
use of checks and other retail noncash payments in the
United States. Federal Reserve Bulletin (August):
360–74.
Gilbert, R. Alton, David C. Wheelock, and Paul W. Wilson.
2002. New evidence on the Fed’s productivity in pro-
viding payments services. Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis Working Paper #2002-020A, September.
Hannan, Timothy H., and John M. McDowell. 1984.
The determinants of technology adoption: The case of
the banking firm. Rand Journal of Economics 15,
no. 3:328–35.
Hendershott, Patric. H., and James D. Shilling. 1989.
The impact of the agencies on conventional fixed-rate
mortgage yields. Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics 2, no. 2:101–15.
Hughes, Joseph P., William W. Lang, Loretta J. Mester,
and Choon-Geol Moon. 1996. Efficient banking under
interstate branching. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 28, no. 4, pt. 2:1045–71.
Humphrey, David. U.S. cash and card payments over
25 years. 2002. Florida State University Working Paper.
Hunter, William C., and Stephen Timme. 1991. Techno-
logical change in large U.S. commercial banks. Journal
of Business 64, no. 3:339–62.
Hunter, William C., Stephen G. Timme, and Won Keun
Yang. 1990. An examination of cost subadditivity and
multiproduct production in large U.S. banks. Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking 22, no. 4:504–25.
ICF Inc. 1990. Effects of the conforming loan limit on
mortgage markets. Final report prepared for the U.S.
Department of Urban Development, Office of Policy
Development and Research. Fairfax, Va.: ICF Inc.
Keeton, William R. 2000. Are mergers responsible for the
surge in new bank charters? Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City Economic Review (First Quarter): 21–41.
Mayes, Elizabeth, ed. 2003. Credit scoring for risk
managers: The handbook for lenders. Mason, Ohio:
Thomson/South-Western.
Mester, Loretta J. 1987. Efficient production of finan-
cial services: Scale and scope economies. Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review
(January): 15–25.
DeYOUNG article  4/12/07  4:12 PM  Page 6566 ECONOMIC REVIEW First and Second Quarters 2007
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 
——— 1997. What’s the point of credit scoring?
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business
Review (September/October): 3–16.
Passmore, Wayne, Roger Sparks, and Jamie Ingpen.
2001. GSEs, mortgage rates, and the long-run effects
of mortgage securitization. Federal Reserve Board
Finance and Economics Discussion Series Working
Paper 2001-26, December.
Petersen, Mitchell A., and Raghuram G. Rajan. 2002.
Does distance still matter? The information revolution
and small business lending. Journal of Finance 57,
no. 6:2533–70.
Porter, Michael E. 1980. Competitive strategy:
Techniques for analyzing industries and com-
petitors. New York: Free Press.
Rossi, Clifford V. 1998. Mortgage banking cost struc-
ture: Resolving an enigma. Journal of Economics
and Business 50, no. 2:219–34.
Scott, Jonathan A. 2004. Small business and the
value of community financial institutions. Journal of
Financial Services Research 25, nos. 2–3:207–30.
Stein, Jeremy C. 2002. Information production and
capital allocation: Decentralized versus hierarchical
firms. Journal of Finance 57, no. 5:1891–1921.
Stigler, George J. 1958. The economies of scale. Journal
of Law and Economics 1 (October): 54–71.
Stiroh, Kevin J. 2004a. Diversification in banking: Is
noninterest income the answer? Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 36, no. 5:853–82.
———. 2004b. Do community banks benefit from
diversification? Journal of Financial Services
Research 25, nos. 2–3:135–60.
Sullivan, Richard J. 2001. Performance and operation
of commercial bank Web sites. Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City Financial Industry Perspectives
(December): 23–33.
White, Lawrence J. 2003. Focusing on Fannie and
Freddie: The dilemmas of reforming housing finance.
Journal of Financial Services Research 23, 
no. 1:43–58.
DeYOUNG article  4/12/07  4:12 PM  Page 66